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Abstract
In spite of achieving revolutionary successes in ma-
chine learning, deep convolutional neural networks
have been recently found to be vulnerable to adver-
sarial attacks and difficult to generalize to novel test
images with reasonably large geometric transfor-
mations. Inspired by a recent neuroscience discov-
ery revealing that primate brain employs disentan-
gled shape and appearance representations for ob-
ject recognition, we propose a general disentangled
deep autoencoding regularization framework that
can be easily applied to any deep embedding based
classification model for improving the robustness
of deep neural networks. Our framework effec-
tively learns disentangled appearance code and ge-
ometric code for robust image classification, which
is the first disentangling based method defending
against adversarial attacks and complementary to
standard defense methods. Extensive experiments
on several benchmark datasets show that, our pro-
posed regularization framework leveraging disen-
tangled embedding significantly outperforms tradi-
tional unreguarlized convolutional neural networks
for image classification on robustness against ad-
versarial attacks and generalization to novel test
data.
1 Introduction
Deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have achieved
revolutionary successes in many machine learning tasks such
as image classification [He et al., 2016a], object detec-
tion [Ren et al., 2015], image segmentation [He et al., 2017],
image captioning [Vinyals et al., 2015], video captioning [Pu
et al., 2018], text-to-video synthesis [Li et al., 2018a], etc.
In spite of these successes, CNNs have recently been shown
to be vulnerable to adversarial images which are created by
adding tiny perturbations to legitimate input images [Paper-
not et al., 2016a; Kurakin et al., 2016]. These adversarial
images that are indistinguishable from real input images by
human observers can cause CNNs to output any target predic-
tion that the attacker wants to have, suggesting that the repre-
sentations learned by CNNs still lack the robustness and the
capability of generalization that biological neural systems ex-
hibit. This security issue of CNNs poses serious challenges in
applying deep learning to mission-critical applications such
as autonomous driving.
Various efforts have been made recently to improve the sit-
uation. Theoretical approaches such as [Wong and Kolter,
2018] propose to learn deep ReLU-based classifiers that are
provably robust against norm-bounded adversarial perturba-
tions on the training data. However, the method still can
not scale to realistic network sizes. Several empirical de-
fense methods have been proposed [Buckman et al., 2018;
Guo et al., 2018; Dhillon et al., 2018]. Nevertheless, as
shown in [Athalye et al., 2018], many of these approaches
do not have guaranteed defenses. On the other hand, neu-
roscience inspired approaches such as [Hinton et al., 2018]
leverage capsule architecture to better learn the relationships
between object parts and the whole, and make the model more
robust and better generalizable.
Recent findings in neuroscience show that, monkey infer-
otemporal (IT) cortex (the final stage of the “what” path-
way of human and monkey visual system) contains separate
regions where neurons exhibit disentangled representations
of shape and appearance properties of face images, respec-
tively. This disentangled representation has been applied to
construct generative models of images [Xing et al., 2018], in
which sampled disentangled embedding vectors are passed to
a generator (decoder) to generate images.
In this paper, we take the above neuroscience inspiration to
regularize the embedding layer of a traditional CNN classifier
by a disentangled deep autoencoder for image classification.
In the regularizing deep autoencoder, an encoder disentan-
gles an input image into a low-dimensional appearance code
capturing the texture or background information and a low-
dimensional geometric code capturing the category-sensitive
shape information, and two decoders reconstruct the origi-
nal high-dimensional input image from the disentangled low-
dimensional code.
Our proposed regularization framework improves CNNs’
robustness and generalization mainly due to the following
two reasons: First, due to the large representational capability
of traditional CNNs, there are a lot of embedding functions
including many pathological ones from high-dimensional in-
put image space to the low-dimensional embedding space that
can equally well minimize the classification loss; the recon-
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struction loss of the deep autoencoder imposes strong regu-
larization on the low-dimensional embedding code directly
used for classification; Second, the disentanglement in the
embedding space imposes additional regularization on the
low-dimensional code, resulting in specialized clean appear-
ance code and geometric code, respectively, which might be,
respectively, more discriminative for different classification
tasks than a low-dimensional code containing a lot of infor-
mation mixed with noise.
Our proposed regularization framework significantly im-
proves the robusness of CNNs against both white-box at-
tacks [Goodfellow et al., 2015; Kurakin et al., 2017; Paper-
not et al., 2016a; Papernot et al., 2016b; Carlini and Wagner,
2017], which assume the model is completely known, and
black-box attacks [Narodytska and Kasiviswanathan, 2017;
Papernot et al., 2017], which can only query the model for a
limited number of times.
Our contributions in this paper are as follows: (i) We pro-
pose the first disentangling based deep autoencoding regular-
ization framework to improve the robustness of CNNs, which
can be easily applied to any embedding based CNN classifica-
tion model and combined with standard defense methods; (ii)
Extensive experiments show that, our regularization frame-
work dramatically improves the robustness of standard CNNs
against the attacks from adversarial examples; (iii) Our pro-
posed framework helps CNNs learn more robust image repre-
sentation and gain better generalization to novel test data with
large geometric differences, achieving state-of-the-art gener-
alization ability compared with capsule networks [Hinton et
al., 2018].
2 Method
2.1 Disentangled Deep Autoencoding
Regularization
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Figure 1: The disentangled deep autoencoding regularization frame-
work for classification.
Suppose we have a K-class training set DT =
{(Ii,yi), i = 1, · · · , N} containing N pairs of samples,
where Ii ∈ RH×W×3 is the image to be classified and
yi ∈ {0, · · · ,K − 1} is the corresponding label. Given a
new test image Ij that does not belongs to DT , the classifica-
tion task is to predict the correct label yj based on the features
Cj extracted from Ij.
To encourage learning visual features robust to natural vari-
ations of images, we employ additional learning objective and
augmentation task to force a classifier to learn disentangled
geometric code and appearance code. As shown in Figure 1,
the proposed framework contains two parts. The first part is
a regularizing autoencoder with disentangled feature embed-
ding, displayed on the top. The second part performs clas-
sification on the concatenated embedding feature vector, dis-
played on the bottom. For any image Ii, the encoder maps it
to a pair of appearance and geometric codes as follows,
Ca,Cg = Encoder(I), (1)
in which our encoder learns a disentangled embedding of the
input image, namely the appearance code Ca and the geo-
metric code Cg . The appearance decoder or generator takes
the appearance code to generate the appearance output Xa.
The geometric decoder takes the geometric code and gener-
ates coordinate displacement of the appearance output Xg .
Xa = Decoder A(Ca),Xg = Decoder G(Cg). (2)
The warping function FW warps the appearance with the co-
ordinate displacement generated by the geometric decoder
and generates the reconstruction output X. This will be de-
scribed in detail later.
X = FW (Xa,Xg). (3)
The classifier FCLS takes both the appearance code and geo-
metric code as input and predicts category probability yˆ.
yˆ = FCLS(Ca,Cg). (4)
In training process, the encoder, two decoders as well as
classifier are trained jointly and the loss function L is defined
as
L = Lcrossentropy(yˆ,y) + λ‖X− I‖, (5)
where y is the training label vector, ‖X−I‖ is the reconstruc-
tion error (frobenius norm), and Lcrossentropy is the cross-
entropy loss, and λ is the regularization weight for the recon-
struction loss.
The disentangled representation is learned in an unsuper-
vised manner. The warping function naturally encourages the
separation of appearance code from geometric code because
Xg represents coordinate displacement of Xa.
Note that the complete architecture is needed only for train-
ing. For inference, the two decoders, warping function and
the reconstruction are not needed.
Warping Function
The warping function, such as the one used in Spatial Trans-
former networks (STN) [Jaderberg et al., 2015], is usually a
combination of geometric transformation for pixels and in-
terpolating operation. The geometric transformation usually
consists of two types: affine transformation and pixel dis-
placement transformation (like the optical flow field). We
employ the second type in this work, similarly as in [Xing et
al., 2018]. The warping function takes the displacement field
and the ”unwarped” image as the input. The vector at each
pixel of the displacement field is defined to be related with
the spatial shift needed to move the destination pixel (x,y) to
source pixel (x0,y0) in the output of the appearance generator
as below:
Φg
(
x
y
)
=
(
x+ dx
y + dy
)
=
(
x0
y0
)
. (6)
where Φg denotes the pixel displacement operation.
The outputs of the pixel displacement operation are usually
decimals. In order to get a set of pixels whose coordinates are
integers, we employ the differentiable bi-linear interpolation
in this work. The bi-linear interpolation process can be rep-
resented as:
X(x, y) = ΣHh=1Σ
W
w=1Xa(h,w)M(1− |x0 − w|)
M(1− |y0 − h|). (7)
where M(·) means the function max(0, ·), and H , W are the
height and width of the input image respectively.
In this way, various pictures of the same object can be en-
coded with similar appearance code, and their differences in
viewing angles, locations, and deformation are captured by
the geometric code. With this idea, we use data augmentation
detailed below to enforce the separation of appearance and
geometric information.
2.2 Data Augmentation and Code Regularization
In this section, we will describe how to combine the proposed
regularization framework with deformation-based data aug-
mentation method. This deformation-based data augmenta-
tion is achieved by random 2D-stretching, scaling and spa-
tial shift of the target images. To encourage appearance code
to capture information invariant to spatial transformation, we
impose L2 regularization on the distance between the appear-
ance codes of images before (denoted as I) and after defor-
mation (I′).
The appearance code and geometric code of I′ from en-
coder are C′a and C
′
g . And the corresponding reconstruction
output and classification output are denoted as X′ and yˆ′. The
new loss function LAUG is
LAUG = L+ Lcrossentropy(yˆ′,y) + λ‖X′ − I′‖
+ γ‖Ca −C′a‖.
(8)
where γ is the scale weight for appearance code regulariza-
tion. We set λ and γ as 1 in experiments.
As shown in Section 3, data augmentation and code reg-
ularization further encourages the separation of appearance
code from geometric code. This leads to much improved gen-
eralization to novel test data with large geometric transforma-
tion.
3 Experiments
In this section, the robustness and generalization to novel test
data of the proposed regularization framework is evaluated.
In addition, ablation studies are performed to analyze the in-
dividual mechanisms that contribute to the gains.
3.1 Robustness Against Adversary Attack
We evaluate our framework’s robustness against both white-
box and black-box attacks. White-box attacks assume that the
adversary knows the network architecture and the model pa-
rameters after training or has access to labeled training data.
An adversary can use the detailed information to construct a
perturbation for a given image. Black-box attacks only rely
on a limited number of queries to the model to construct an
adversarial image.
To compare with the related work such as [Hinton et al.,
2018], we use three dataseets, the MNIST dataset, the Face-
Scrub dataset, and the CIFAR10 datasset. The MNIST dataset
of handwriten digits has 60000 for training and 10000 for
test. The FaceScrub data set contains 106,863 face images
of 530 celebrities taken under real-world conditions. The CI-
FAR10 dataset contains 60,000 color images with a resolution
of 32x32 in 10 different classes, in which 50,000 are used for
training and 10,000 are used for test.
White-Box Attack
We evaluate our model’s robustness using popular white box
attack methods: fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [Goodfel-
low et al., 2015] and Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [Kurakin
et al., 2017]. FGSM computes the gradient of the loss with
respect to each pixel intensity and then changes the pixel in-
tensity by a fixed amount  in the direction that increases the
loss. BIM applies FGSM with multiple smaller steps when
creating the adversarial image. FGSM and BIM are adopted
as the main attack methods by a series of works. Since these
methods attack the image based on the gradient, they pose a
great threat to modern CNN architecture trained through gra-
dient back-propagation.
We use the same benchmark CNN architecture as [Hinton
et al., 2018]. It has 4 convolutional layers with a softmax out-
put. For fair comparison, the classifier part of the proposed
framework uses exactly the same architecture as the bench-
mark CNN architecture. To test the robustness of the pro-
posed framework, adversarial images are generated from the
test set using a fully trained model. We then reported the ac-
curacy of the model on these images. All models are trained
without adversary examples.
As show in Table 1 and 2, the proposed regularization
framework is much more robust than the benchmark CNN
architecture. 1
Table 1: Attack Success Rate Comparison on MNIST Dataset
(FGSM)
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Base CNN 76.3% 89.4% 96.7% 97.3% 97.6%
Ours 8.8% 12.3% 16.2% 25.8% 38.5%
Table 2: Attack Success Rate Comparison on MNIST Dataset (BIM)
 (iters) 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
Base CNN (2) 7.4% 29.4% 54.3% 74.4% 87.6%
Ours (2) 9.8% 20.6% 27.4% 31.0% 33.4%
Base CNN (3) 7.8% 30.7% 55.4% 75.3% 88.3%
Ours (3) 10.3% 22.1% 29.2% 32.4% 34.7%
It’s worth noting that for defending against the adversary
attack with large perturbation, simply adding the proposed
regularization even exceeds some defense models that used
adversary training. For example, our model shows a higher
1The visualization of feature embedding of legitimate images
and adversarial images on the MNIST dataset can be found in the
supplementary material.
performance (61.5%) over the gradient-regularized model
[Ross and Doshi-Velez, 2017] (lower than 60%) when per-
turbed with a big perturbation (0.5) by FGSM on MNIST
Dataset.
We further evaluate our model’s robustness using Face-
Scrub dataset. To simplify the problem, we randomly se-
lect 50 faces for the classification task. For the benchmark
CNN architecture, the training and test accuracy is 99.9% and
74.2%, respectively. While after adding the proposed regu-
larization, the training and test accuracy is 99.9% and 79.8%,
respectively. As shown in Table 3 and 4, the regularization
framework is much more robust than the benchmark CNN
model. Please note that  = 0.05 is big enough as a perturba-
tion in this task.
Table 3: Attack Success Rate Comparison on FaceScrub dataset
(FGSM)
 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
Base CNN 57.8% 67.0% 72.9% 78.3% 82.2%
Ours 19.9% 24.6% 27.9% 33.4% 38.9%
Table 4: Attack Success Rate Comparison on FaceScrub dataset
(BIM)
 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
Base CNN 72.1% 94.7% 99.2% 99.8% 99.6%
Ours 26.2% 35.6% 44.1% 52.7% 60.7%
Finally, the framework is tested with CIFAR10 dataset to
evaluate the proposed disentangling method on general natu-
ral images where the information of categories can lie in both
appearance code and geometric code in varying degrees. In
this experiment, data augmentation methods including ran-
dom cropping and random flipping are applied to the normal-
ized input data. We use 110-layer ResNet [He et al., 2016b]
as the baseline and it achieves 8.5% error rate on the test set.
To add the proposed regularization, the output of the final
fully-connected layer of the ResNet is modified to generate
geometric and appearance code. The decoder is the same as
described in the main text. With our proposed special regu-
larization, the network achieves 8.2% error rate. The defense
result is shown as below:
Table 5: Attack success rate comparison on CIFAR10 dataset
(FGSM)
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Base CNN 29.5% 39.9% 47.4% 53.8% 59.3%
Ours 19.0% 26.8% 33.5% 39.4% 44.4%
As shown in Table 5 and Table 6, our method outperforms
the CNN baseline for the FGSM attack and BIM attack. The
proposed method improves over CNN baseline by 15% to
37% for FGSM attack.
Black-Box Attack
The first black-box attack method we use is proposed in
[Narodytska and Kasiviswanathan, 2017]. The basic idea is
Table 6: Attack success rate comparison on CIFAR10 dataset (BIM)
 (iters) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
CNN Baseline (2) 0.403 0.615 0.761 0.844 0.884
Ours (2) 0.247 0.502 0.700 0.808 0.867
CNN Baseline (3) 0.474 0.706 0.833 0.891 0.908
Ours (3) 0.346 0.626 0.783 0.851 0.892
greedy local search. It is an iterative search procedure, where
in each round a local neighborhood is used to refine the cur-
rent image and to optimize some objective function depend-
ing on the network output. The number of iterations of the
black-box attack is adjusted as an experimental variable. As
shown in Table 7, the proposed regularization method can sig-
nificantly promote the benchmark CNN architecture.
Table 7: Attack Success Rate on MNIST dataset (Local Search)
Iters 50 150
Base CNN 57.3% 62.5%
Ours 47.9% 57.8%
Besides the greedy local search black-box attack approach,
another black-box attack approach [Papernot et al., 2017]
leverages transferability property in creating adversarial ex-
amples. The attack first creates attack examples using a
known deep learning model (white-box attack). The attack
then apply these adversarial examples on the deep learning
model with no access to model architecture and parameters.
We tried this type of black-box attack and observed that our
method has no noticeable advantage over benchmark CNN
architecture. This is not surprising as transferability property
applies to both deep learning models and non-deep learning
models such as decision trees and SVM in general [Papernot
et al., 2017].
Joint Defense
As has been stated, the proposed framework is orthogonal
to other defense techniques. It can potentially be combined
with these defense techniques to further improve the robust-
ness of CNN models. As an example, we combine it with
adversarial training. Specifically, we train the model with le-
gitimate inputs (MNIST) and adversarial samples generated
by the model using FGSM attack method with  of 0.3 [Ross
and Doshi-Velez, 2017].
Table 8: Attack Success Rate Comparison on MNIST Dataset
(FGSM with adversarial training)
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Base CNN 9.55% 22.0% 32.9% 42.9% 55.4%
Ours 9.49% 12.4% 15.6% 22.3% 34.8%
As shown in Table 8, the result proves that our regulariza-
tion method could be combined with adversarial training to
further improve the robustness of the classifiers. Our method
with no adversarial training (see Table 1 in the main paper)
outperforms CNN baseline with adversarial training (See Ta-
ble 8). Our method with adversarial training (See Table 8)
further outperforms our method without adversarial training
(see Table 1 in the main paper). For example, it is 34.8% vs
38.5% for  = 0.5.
3.2 Generalization
We evaluate our model’s generalization to novel test data
with large geometric transformation on the smallNORB
dataset[LeCun et al., 2004]. The dataset contains five cate-
gories of 3D objects (animals, human, airplanes, trucks and
cars), each with 10 instances. These images are captured
through a combination of six illumination conditions, nine
elevations, and eighteen azimuths and have a resolution of 96
× 96. The training set and the testing set contain 5 different
instances of each category. This data set requires the model
to learn the common features within each target category.
For ease of comparison, we use the same experimental
setting and the same network architecture of the benchmark
CNN as reported in [Hinton et al., 2018]. Both our model and
baseline CNN model are trained on one-third of the training
set, which contains six smallest azimuths or 3 smallest eleva-
tions, and tested on two-thirds of the test set, which contains
images of totally different azimuths and elevations from those
in training set. For training, we randomly crop 48 × 48 sub-
patch from the input image, resize the patch into 32× 32 and
add small random jitters to brightness and contrast. For test-
ing, the samples are directly cropped from the center. For
both training and testing, all data have been normalized to
have zero mean and unit variance.
To better disentangle geometric code from appearance
code, we use the data augmentation and code regularization
technique proposed in Section 2.2. Specifically, deformations
such as displacement and stretching to the inputs is applied.
The extent of stretching in this experiment is randomly se-
lected from {2, 4, 6, 8} pixels, the distance of displacement
in each dimension (in the range of {2, 4, 6, 8}) and the orien-
tation of displacement are also randomly selected. Then the
samples are re-sized back to 32 × 32 and padded by pixels
at the edge when necessary. These deformation operations
do not change the appearance contents. The L2 norm of the
difference between appearance codes of an input image and
those corresponding to its deformed image are used as a reg-
ularization term as in Section 2.2.
Table 9: Generalization comparison on novel viewpoints
Test set Azimuth Elevation
Base CNN 84.8% 78.8%
Ours 86.6% 85.3%
As shown in Table 9, our model is 8% better in accuracy
when generalizing to novel elevation and 2% better in case
of novel azimuth. We note that of particular challenge, the
task is to generalize to novel elevation and azimuth. The test
distribution is different from the training distribution which
makes the classification extremely hard. For example, Fig-
ure 2 shows the cars in testing set with the highest visual sim-
ilarity to example cars in training set. With largely different
azimuths and elevations and even shapes, the generalization
task can be difficult even for human observers.
Training Sample Testing Samples
Elevations
Azimuths
Figure 2: The comparison of distribution between the training data
and testing data of the smallNORB dataset’s. The top row shows
trucks under different azimuths in training and testing set, while the
second row displays the cars under different elevations. Notice that
the instances in training set and testing set are highly different.
Note that our CNN baseline performance on novel eleva-
tion is lower than that reported in [Hinton et al., 2018] while
the performance on novel azimuth is higher. Although we
use exactly the same network architecture according to the
description in [Hinton et al., 2018], such difference may be
unavoidable given that many parameters such as brightness
and contrast jittering range need to be tuned, which were not
mentioned in the paper. Our result on generalizing to novel
azimuth achieves state-of-the-art. We achieve 86.6%, com-
parable to 86.5% of CapsuleNet as reported in [Hinton et al.,
2018]. For generalizing to novel elevation, even compared
with the CNN benchmark result of 82.2% reported in [Hin-
ton et al., 2018], our result of 85.3% is still 3.7% better. It
is worth noting that our method is orthogonal to the capsule
technique [Hinton et al., 2018]. Potentially the strength of
feature disentangling and the capsule design may be com-
bined to further improve performance.
3.3 Synthesis Study
To evaluate the quality of disentangling, we examine the
property of ”unwarped” face image Xa and the exchange-
ability of Cg and Ca. Two faces (I0 and I1) are ran-
domly selected and encoded by our model as C0a,C
0
g) and
(C1a,C
1
g). We then exchange their codes into (C
0
a,C
1
g)
and (C1a,C
0
g). The swapped codes are then decoded
by the appearance and geometric decoder and new im-
ages are synthesized by the warping function: Xinew =
FW (Decoder A(C
i
a),Decoder G(C
1−i
g )), where i ∈
{0, 1}.
Two pairs of (X0new, X
1
new) are visualized on Figure 3.
The appearance output is Decoder A(Cia), which is the
”unwarped” image. The reconstruction output is the warped
output without swapping code (Xi) and the swap code output
is the the warped output after swapping code (Xinew). Group
1 and Group 2 emphasize the effects of maintaining geomet-
ric code and appearance code, respectively, while exchanging
the other code. This figure prominently reflects the role of the
geometric code and the appearance code in the face recon-
struction process of the proposed model. It can be observed
that the geometric code mainly contains some deformation in-
formation, such as the facial features, the expression and even
the face orientation. On the other hand, the appearance code
Input Appearance
Output 
Reconstruction Swap Code 
Output
Group 2Group 1
Input Appearance
Output 
Reconstruction Swap Code 
Output
Figure 3: The synthesis study on code representation. Appearance outputs Decoder A(Ca) are all front-facing faces. Exchanging appear-
ance and geometric codes generates new images with exchanged properties of the original images, as shown in columns of swap code output.
Group 1 displays swap-code outputs with appearance code exchanged; Group 2 displays swap-code outputs with geometric code exchanged.
contains texture information, such as skin color, hair color,
background as well as the basic structure of face.
3.4 Ablation Studies
We conduct ablation studies to analyze the relative contribu-
tions of each design component in our framework: disentan-
gled representation learning, augmented training, L2 regular-
ization of appearance code difference when an input image
is deformed. We first investigate the benefit of disentangled
feature learning in terms of robustness to FSGM attack us-
ing MNIST dataset. To disable disentangled feature learn-
ing, the warping function component is removed from Fig-
ure 1. We refer it as ’Reconstruction’ in Table 10. As shown
in Table 10, disentangled feature learning is essential for the
model to be robust against FGSM, e.g. 16.15% success rate
vs 43.83% success rate at =0.3.
Table 10: Ablation Study: Attack Success Rate on the MNIST
dataset (FGSM attack)
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Recon. 11.5% 24.1% 43.8% 57.8% 67.6%
Ours 8.8% 12.3% 16.2% 25.8% 38.5%
Table 11: Ablation Study on the smallNORB dataset; AT: aug-
mented training, CR: code regularization
Settings Base CNN Ours
Base model 81.3% 84.4%
with AT 84.8% 85.3%
with AT and CR None 86.6%
Another ablation study are further conducted on general-
ization using smallNORB dataset. The experimental settings
is the same as section 3.2. The base model in Table 11 is
the architecture in Figure 1 with no augmented training and
additional regularization. The augmented training settings in
Table 11 refers to training with augmented data by deform-
ing input data. The augmented training and code regulariza-
tion setting in Table 11 means that the L2 regularization of
appearance code difference between an input image and its
deformed one is further imposed.
Results in Table 11 show that with the proposed regular-
ization framework, the CNN base model is promoted in all
settings. It also shows that augmented training and additional
regularization helps. With both augmented training and L2
regularization, the improvement over the base model is 2.2%.
4 Related Work
There has been several works on learning disentangled fea-
ture representation in the machine learning literature. [Den-
ton and Birodkar, 2017] and [Hsieh et al., 2018] disentangled
video representation into content and pose. [Villegas et al.,
2017] disentangled video representation into content and mo-
tion using image differences for video prediction. [Li et al.,
2018b] learn disentangled representations using analogy rea-
soning. Unlike previous methods that model pose with a rigid
affine mapping, the coordinate displacement in our work is a
non-rigid deformable mapping. In addition, most of previous
methods require learning from video data in order to utilize
the time-dependent features in pose and time-independent
ones in content. Our model does not require time-series data
and is suitable for independently sampled image data. Finally,
our proposed framework aims to improve the robustness of
CNNs, which has a completely different purpose from previ-
ous models.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
Robustness and generalization are paramount to deploying
deep learning models in mission-critical applications. In this
paper, we take inspiration from neuroscience and show that
disentangling feature representation into appearance and geo-
metric code can significantly improve the robustness and gen-
eralization of CNNs.
There are other mechanisms at play for the robustness and
generalization ability of primate brain’s perception. In the fu-
ture, we plan to explore other neuroscience motivated direc-
tions. For example, our model can be potentially combined
with capsule networks [Hinton et al., 2018].
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6 Supplementary Material: Robust feature
embedding against attacks
To verify that our model indeed has a more robust feature embed-
ding, we used t-SNE [Maaten and Hinton, 2008] to visualize the
embedding of adversarial images against legitimate images from
MNIST dataset for both baseline model and our model in Figure
4. Indeed, the embedding in the joint appearance and geometric
code in our model for attacked images (4d) maintains stronger sepa-
rability compared to baseline CNN (4b). One of the reasons that we
expect our model to be more robust against adversarial attack is that
appearance and geometric features may each be more suitable for
different classification tasks. Take digits as examples, several digits
share the same topological structure but mainly differ in their geo-
metric properties. By separating the feature space to Ca and Cg ,
we provide to the classifier FCLS shape codes Cg which live on
a lower dimensional space than needed for traditional CNN, which
makes the training more data-efficient. Interestingly, this is also re-
flected in the embedding structures: as shown in Figures 4e and 4g,
even before attack, manifolds of different digits are entangled in the
space of Ca. But as shown in 3f and 3h, the embedding in Cg stays
highly separable even after attack, suggesting the classifier indeed is
able to utilize the more robust code Cg .
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 4: t-SNE visualization of the feature embedding of (a) the baseline CNN before attack. (b) the baseline CNN after attack. (c) the
entire code of the proposed model before attack. (d) the entire code of the proposed model after attack. The t-SNE (e) the appearance code
of the proposed model before attack. (f) the geometric code of the proposed model before attack. (g) the appearance code of the proposed
model after attack. (h) the geometric code of the proposed model after attack. Visualization is conducted on MNIST dataset with FGSM (
= 0.3). Each color corresponds to one digit. In the visualization effect of model after attack, the square points denote the embedding code
before attack and the triangle points denotes the code after attack (visible after zooming in).
